THE OTHERS

My father is a 1960 batch IPS officer. He retired in 1995 and, at eighty years of age, spends more time at the golf course than his doctor would like.

IPS officers heading Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) like BSF, CRPF, SSB, CISF and ITBP, is the topic of many a heated dinnertime debate.

Debating with him is never easy. But over a period of time, he has started conceding that it is time that CAPFs had their own cadre. There is grudging acceptance that they must have a direct entry officer as Director General and Chief. Dad is eighty, but still carries the recoil of a 303 Lee Enfield bolt-action rifle.

A uniformed force is made up of tradition, training, honour, blood, death, victory, defeat, brotherhood and leadership. That is the nature of uniformed forces everywhere. “We are good enough to die. We are just not good enough to lead”, says a CAPF officer to me, bitterly. Resentment against the IPS cadre runs deep in CAPFs.

I have a lot of respect for IPS officers. They are brilliant and erudite. They know their job. But their job is not guarding the borders, anti-Naxal operations or counter-insurgency operations. They are brilliant at police work. That is where they belong. That is where they must stay.

A vast majority of IPS officers have no experience in counter insurgency, internal security, anti terrorism and border management. But they will para-drop one fine morning, from a state cadre, to head a professional force comprising of hundreds of thousands of men and women. They will, without one day’s experience in anything apart from state police work, lead a force, which is neck deep in counter insurgency, anti-Naxal operations, border-management and riot control.

They will be there for two years and in those two years, will possibly spend a year understanding that force. After that, in a bid for immortality, they will initiate changes in the force so that they are remembered. And these changes will set back the force by years.

If you are an officer of the CAPFs, know this. You may have fantastic leadership skills, be professionally excellent and display great operational expertise, but you are like the Pandavas gambling with dice. The dice are loaded against you. You have lost the game even before you started playing it.

The CAPFs are an important and integral part of our national security profile. But they need to be fundamentally changed. It will cause pain and acute discomfort, but that is in intrinsic part of any operation.

We must give the CAPFs (Central Armed Police Forces) their own unique identity. There are two ways to do it.

The first option is the army way. Make them Para Military forces like the Assam Rifles and have army officers coming in for deputation for a fixed period of 3 years. After 6 years, when two rotations are complete, the force will settle down and the CAPFs (now full fledged para military forces) will complement the army. They will get the same type of training and culture that the Indian Army has…hard driving and aggressive. But this option has many flaws. The CAPFs operate amongst the local populace, far more than the army does. Their job is peculiar and complex. Sometimes, the sheer complexity is mind-boggling.

The only solution is Option Two, and that is for the CAPFs to have their own cadre. What are the practical steps that can lead to the overall professionalization of CAPFs?

The Border Security Force (BSF), Shasastra Seema Bal (SSB) and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) must be combined into one force and entity. Similarly, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) must be combined to into one cohesive entity. The BSF, SSB and ITBP combine can be called Indian Border Guards of IBG. The CRPF and CISF combine can be called the Homeland Security Force or HSF.

The acts and rules of these forces must change completely. They must cease to be “central police” forces. When they are called for helping the state police, they should not be placed under the local police. These forces have been called because the state police either do not have the resources or are not competent enough to handle the situation. It would be a better idea to put the local police under these forces. These forces must act independently. When the state police requisitions them, all infrastructure and facilities must be provided to them before they deploy. You can’t have your saviors staying in under construction building without running water or electricity. The states must fulfill their responsibilities. A case in point…on 3 April 2017, a CRPF Sub-Inspector fell to his death from the stairs because the accommodation provided for CRPF by J&K government was an under construction building. It was dark and there were no railings. The CRPF was deployed for by-elections, on the request for the state government.

The uniform of these forces must be changed. Three types of uniforms are good enough…ceremonial, official and operational. Operational uniform can change with the terrain; jungle, high altitude, plains or desert. They must not wear khaki. It is too closely associated with the police identity.

Current ranks must go. You cannot have senior level officers being designated as DIG, IG or DG. It is too “police”. Any relationship to police must be erased from existence and memory.

There must be a cut off date for having a cadre officer as the head of the force. Lets say it takes 15 years to bring the force to such a level where a direct entry officer can become the Chief of the force. For those 15 years, the Indian Army will have to pitch in. The Government of India must nominate two General Officers who have successfully completed their tenures as Army Commanders. GOC-in-Cs who have commanded the Western Army and the Northern Army would be prime candidates. Those who are not in line for COAS may be chosen. By an act of Parliament, they must be given a fixed tenure of 5 years, post their Army Command.

These general officers will have a clear, written roadmap and deliverables. I know the Indian Army. They will deliver. Earthquakes and tsunamis are not acceptable excuses in the army. An order is given. It is carried out.

Each such General Officer who takes over as Chief of these two forces will bring a team of 250 officers, JCOs and NCOs with him, from the Indian Army. This will be Core Training Team. The truth is that there are no better instructors than the Indian Army. Indian Army Generals will man all current positions of Additional DG, Special DG and DG. They will have a clear and written mandate to develop the cadre officers in 15 years. And in that stipulated time, all Indian Army officers will either go back to army or retire. Those who were born in it MUST lead the force. In the 15^th year, the Chief of IBG and HSF will be a directly appointed officer.

The Government of India must sanction land and funds to create top class training institutions just like the Indian Army has. These new forces must have a separate YO wing, Junior Command, Staff College, Senior Command, Higher Command and NDC like institutions. Institutions like CIJWS, HAWS and commando wing need to be created, along professional lines.

Direct entry at the JCO/ ASI level must stop. This rank at the direct entry level has no relevance. Ranks equivalent to Lance Naik (one stripe) and Naik (two stripes) must be introduced. Like in the army, if they are capable, they will rise. If not, they should be sent home.

During training, under-trainee officers must be considered cadets. They should not be officers. You cannot pass an exam and become an officer. You have to earn that honour. In the army, Gentlemen Cadets are put through the grind. If they are capable and prove themselves, they become officers. Many leave in between, not able to cope with training. Army training is not nice. They do their best to break you. That must be the core-training ethos of these two new forces.

Once these officers pass out from their academies, they must each spend a year with an Indian Army battalion in operations. And they must start off with commanding a platoon and after 6 months; move on to become company 2iCs. They should be understudies of an experienced company commander. After one year with the Indian Army, they should directly go for their Young Officers Course of their respective forces. The age for direct entry officers must be capped at 25 years. The younger, the better.

It is critical to develop “regimentation” in these forces. Without regimentation, a force has no identity. Currently, you may join one battalion after passing out and after three years, find yourself in another battalion. You may never serve in the battalion that you were commissioned into. Loyalty takes a hit. You have no emotional moorings. There are many aspects to regimentation and the Core Training Group must delve deeply into it. Even now, when army officers speak about me, its always “I spoke to Major Gaurav Arya…woh Kumaon Regiment wala”. I know the Indian Army well. Even when I die, they will say, “MGA passed away…woh Kumaon Regiment wala”.

Multiple officer entries must be stopped. There must be only two entries – direct and technical. You should not be able to be promoted to officer rank. Like in the army, you must go through the Academy (ACC Wing at IMA).

There must be immediate modernization of these forces, with a slew of new equipment including artillery, limited airlift capability, limited salt-water and riverine capability and armored troop carriers.

Both these forces must be young forces. It’s sad to see 55-year-old inspectors trudging along uneven terrain, unable to cope. National Security is a serious business. It must be merit based. Anything else is a compromise.

Once these steps are effectively implemented, India can start the next steps. Except for Siachen and some other critical patches, the Indian Army must move out and over a period of 15 years, hand over most border areas to IBG troops. This will, off course, be done after developing capabilities. Indian Army must move to locations behind borders. I say this because the Indian Army is an offensive force. It must be used in war. That’s the DNA of the Indian Army.

Once this is done, we should actively look at foreign bases for deployment of the Indian Armed Forces. Africa, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean are where we must have theater commands. Outward projection of military power is what we must aim at. And that is only possible when you have strong, professional, well-equipped and motivated forces to guard India.

For too long we have treated CAPFs as India’s stepchildren. They are neither army nor police. And yet, thousands of them have laid down their lives defending India from internal and external threats. They deserve to lead their own force.

They have shed enough blood.

Major Gaurav Arya (Veteran)

17^th Battalion, The Kumaon Regiment

Indian Army

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